Abstract-This paper describes current efforts to architect, research, develop, and test a next-generation, high-bandwidth network monitoring framework designed to handle the rigors of large scientific feeds. This framework will be capable of transparently capturing and analyzing network traffic in real time so as to enable early and rapid response to potential threats. We seek to adapt and integrate existing and ongoing work on streaming data analysis on the wire and packet capture with realtime analytics using accelerators to create a next-generation, high-bandwidth network-monitoring framework. Flow interrogation in real time will transparently divert selected network flows to an attached computing infrastructure and subject them to processing and analysis. With acceptable quality of service (QoS), this system will detect suspicious activities, with innocent flows allowed to proceed to their original destination and suspicious flows are either dropped or further processed and monitored with appropriate storage and analysis. Going beyond detecting what would be the preponderance of attack vectors to identifying all attack vectors including the subtle methods of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Although it is hard to hack the existing systems, with no direct monitoring or air-gap, a determined adversary such as an APT could find a way onto a government network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern high-bandwidth networks pose a major cyber security challenge as current technologies are lagging behind in capabilities to analyze the bulk of the network traffic and detect threats in real time. For example, DOE laboratories are currently interconnected through ESnet with multiple 100Gbps links, 400Gbps has been tested, and it is expected that such cutting edge networks will reach terabit speeds within the next few years. Typical firewalls, intrusion detection, and other protection systems cannot handle traffic at such high rates without significant adverse effects on the traffic (bottlenecks) or long delays in detection (e.g., only support for offline analysis). To avoid such problems, scientific "Big Data" streams are typically considered trustworthy and set up to bypass protection systems, offering adversaries unique and unguarded access to both DOE networks and laboratory computing systems, including highperformance computing systems. These streams are often unencrypted pathways into government networks. Further, packets are often of uniform length and structure giving a sophisticated and determined adversary (e.g., state sponsored) opportunity to deploy dedicated attacks (e.g., imposter packets) to exploit these features. Therefore, novel and effective approaches are necessary to monitor and protect such high bandwidth (100+ Gbps) networks.
In support of a rational to promote high bandwidth monitoring, this document also presents efforts to architect, research, develop, and test a next-generation, high-bandwidth network monitoring framework designed to handle the rigors of large scientific data feeds. This framework will be capable of transparently capturing and analyzing network traffic in real time so as to enable early and rapid response to potential threats. We seek to adapt and integrate existing and ongoing work on streaming data analysis on the wire [1] with real-time analytics using accelerators to create a next-generation, highbandwidth network-monitoring framework. Flow interrogation in real time will transparently divert selected network flows to an attached computing infrastructure and subject them to processing and analysis. With acceptable QoS, this system will detect suspicious activities, with "innocent" flows allowed to proceed to their original destination and suspicious flows either dropped or further processed and monitored, with appropriate storage and analysis. Key in this approach is the scalability and efficiency of the new framework so that the bulk of the traffic is scrutinized to at least a predetermined minimum degree without any significant delays that may have an adverse impact on individual flows. Given the specialized nature of high-speed networks, suitable vendor hardware is often necessary or desirable. The proposed system uses reasonably priced COTS components, which is an ideal alternative to expensive special purpose equipment. Our proposed architecture will follow a divide and conquer approach, by dividing the main high-bandwidth traffic (aggregate) stream into smaller parallel streams effectively handled by COTS equipment. Depending on the capabilities and capacities of the networking hardware, we anticipate a 2-level network topology to divide the main traffic into smaller streams that can be effectively processed by the attached computing infrastructure. The traffic is divided in multiple streams, is diverted to the computing nodes where it is processed. Each smaller stream will be processed on a separate multicore/many core node running a number of virtual machines, which in turn implement desirable filtering/detection functions. The same can be achieved, of course, using a number of separate hosts. With the potential of processing speed being the utmost of importance, we intent to utilize FPGAs or GPUs to accelerate the processing algorithms. The first pass processing is essentially a triage to decide which traffic can be forwarded immediately and which warrants further processing. Traffic deemed suspicious can be further scrutinized and/or stored for further analysis, even diverted to an alternate destination. The proposed approach can deeply affect long-term network monitoring and architectures, especially when today's "Big Data" networks become tomorrow's commodity communication channels. The potential for a federated DOE system monitoring the entire WAN domains interconnecting DOE sites with unprecedented intelligence and the ability to scale to terabit speeds and beyond is the intended long-term goal of this work.
II. RATIONALE
Network capacity and performance, measured by bandwidth "speed" is a perennial research topic usually driven by large data-rich scientific experiments. The desire to improve a networks "speed" is always under consideration and there is a constant increasing outer-boundary of what is attainable and almost possible. Currently 100 gbs (100 x 2 30 bits per second) is readily found on larger networks hosting scientific data flow. There has been successful testing of 400 gbs and development of tera (2 40 ) bit networks are underway. High bandwidth, for the scope of this discussion, will be networks with top speeds of greater than or equal to 100 gbs.
Data resulting from large scientific experiments and to a lesser extent data coming off High Performance computers are primarily handled by the Department of Energy's ESnet which has responded to these demands with admirable success and dexterity. 100gbs is available for both live experiments and for the purpose of network research. Security for high bandwidth consumers (i.e., big science) is also considered and introduced into the network via a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The guiding mantra for science data is keeping it in an environment that has appropriate level of security constrains so as not to inhibit the necessary flow of traffic from experiment to storage, to reconstruction and analysis. This is an undisputable reality. A probabilistic approach to the security of science networks is therefore appropriate. That being scientific data will probably not get hacked therefore lesser scrutiny is required. It is, however, worth revisiting and recalibrating the analysis and risk assessment periodically especially as technologies advance. Also, it is important to have a complete set of input variables represented in the assessment to ensure an accurate assessment of consequence. As a case in point risk, probability, and cost should be bound by the significance of the resulting consequence of a malicious action. With this in mind there are two specific points this paper wishes to add to the discussion of high-bandwidth monitoring:
1) There is novel technology that shows the promise to take a closer look, in fact actually look at, high bandwidth science data with the ability to scale to all predicted speeds of the future and
2) The threat of sophisticated adversaries, such as nation-state actors known as advanced persistent threats (APTs) present a potentially extremely high consequence if compromising networks and systems sponsored by the U.S. Government.
A. Analysis on the Wire (AoW)
Intelligent networks built upon a combination of hardware and software defined networks (SDN) have shown promising results with regard to accelerated network analysis. Work on these networks at BNL vis-à-vis the Analysis On the Wire project has demonstrated an agile and scalable network infrastructure that can:
• Assign as many resources as needed -from a server to a data center • Ensure quality of service using accelerators such as FPGAs and GPUs • Integrate custom algorithms • Support bandwidth scalability -divide and conquer larger volumes of data to terabit and beyond • Include middleware that can federate network devices on the WAN • Keep costs reasonable -vendor independenceusing COTS • Allow for incremental implementation using an overlay technology (SDN portion) -increment implementation, current infrastructure remains
B. Security and High-bandwidth
Although 100gbs networks are in production there exist limited solutions available to verify the security of data and their transfer. Security is presented in a probabilistic paradigm, in that an assumption is made that if a flow is known to be science data it is, to a large extent, trusted. These flows of science data, known as elephant flows, can be characterized and therefore identified by a consistent packet size, bandwidth requirement and duration. Further these flows often originate from a known location, that being a large science experiments or HPC. Full inspection of packets using current technology is not practical with regard to potential yield (i.e., identifying malware) versus potential cost; with regard to both performance and monetarily. Therefore there is very little scrutiny of these flows.
At this point in time the most traffic flowing at high-speed rates are elephant flow science data. Therefore it is a reasonable and accepted practice to exempt this type of data for inspection with the understanding that it will "probably" not be malicious or contain malicious packets. The source and the data stream, or in some cases the exact combination of source and stream, is therefore trusted. Various technology advancements in the commercial sector provide indications of the desire and need for high bandwidth networking. The "Internet of Things" (IoT), deep learning and data fusion are just a few modern technologies sending a lot of data onto our existing network infrastructure. The desire for faster transport will inevitably follow.
C. Current Solutions
As mentioned there is some attention given to the security of these flows. Although an elephant flow is inherently trusted, a system developed at Berkeley National Lab [2] will inspect anomalous traffic. ESnet also keeps elephant flows separate from other network traffic by segregating them into a DMZ.
Using a combination of the BRO intrusion detection system [2] and shunting, Berkeley has developed an elegant solution using probabilistic exemption. A series of parallel switches receives a 100gbs flow and a record is kept of each packet. If the flow is determined to be an elephant flow the packet is shunted aside and not inspected. Science data or packets that look like science data are trusted and not inspected. A BRO IDS will inspect the remainder of packets, any flow that does not register as science data.
Using the concept of segregation, the Department of Energy's ESnet separates elephant flows from typical internet traffic using a separate network domain called the DMZ. [3] With regard to this discussion, the DMZ keeps elephant flows free of the intense scrutiny imposed by local firewalls and their ids' but also keeps the unmonitored traffic, at least temporarily away from the "main" network of an institution. It is unclear if these data move onto a campus network what level of scrutiny will be enforced and although separate there is no air-gap between networks. It is here where the discussion of an APT begins. There is no doubt that this system is hard to hack and not attractive to the typical criminal hacker. There is no monetary yield. However, it would be attractive to either a malicious or curious APT. An unscrutinized network, giving a hacker unlimited time, and with no air-gap in place, a determined adversary will likely find a way to compromise the system or the data. The risk assessment should therefore be reflective of a potential high consequence assigned to this low probability event.
D. Stated Case
The case for monitoring High bandwidth systems therefore lies in the assumptions that common Internet networks will eventually outpace commodity detection. Further, upon improvements, commodity detection systems, which commonly come in the form of appliances, will not scale to the next bandwidth increment. Government systems are currently at a low degree of risk, however, with a large potential consequence. A novel technology is available to address these issues at a reasonable cost. The remainder of the paper addresses ongoing work in that direction.
III. APPROACH

A. Concept
The basic concept of AoW states that one or more network device, may be programmed to recognize specific data flows and transparently apply computation on the data before forwarding it to its destination. There is a natural adaption to monitoring high-bandwidth networks by applying security algorithms. Three main components are needed; a module that can identify and classify packets of a desired data stream (e.g., an elephant flow), a module to forward these packets to a data processor and from there back to their original destination.
With precedence based in firewalls and network IDS and using the guiding, albeit unmeasured, principle that there is more data in transit than in rest at any given moment, analyzing data on the wire seems a natural performance enhancer. Understanding that with appropriate processing assistance (e.g., GPU, FGPA) SDN technology has advanced enough in the last 5 years to start to experiment with network function virtualization in advanced network settings; BNL envisions a framework that overlays existing high-bandwidth networks with an enhanced monitoring technology. Concentrating on the relatively unexplored northbound interface, this framework will provide custom real-time data analysis without compromising QoS and promising scalability to foreseeable bandwidth enhancements, terabit and beyond. The initial steps in producing such a framework, thereby fortifying one of the claims in favor of monitoring high bandwidth traffic, an available technology exists and is described below. Progress up to the point of NYSDS17 conference is presented. It is indeed preliminary, however each step taken has validated the underlying principles of AoW thus far. Figure 1 shows the initial simple-circuit SDN architecture used to 1) send packets across software defined service functions and 2) add algorithms to analyze the passing data stream. The architecture contains two hosts, two forwarders required by the SDN to forward traffic to and from the service function and a service function which contains the algorithms code. The flow was controlled by an Open Daylight controller using the open flow protocol. The hosts, forwarders and service functions were generated using light weight Docker containers. Additional service function placed in line could add security algorithms or any addition analysis code from the simple to more complex analysis working on a smaller subset of the network flow. That is only subsets of the previous service function would be sent to the next in-line.
Passing data through a service function chain is new technology that is currently in the process of being standardized, with no actual implementations being available for regular use. Therefore, any attempt to use the technology requires considerable trial and error, configuration tweaks and adjustments. The setup used, consists of a Vagrant Virtual machine(VM), which has other nodes as docker containers. Dockers are typically lightweight and relatively much faster than having all nodes in the framework as VMs.
The VM is our Manager in the setup, which manages the other nodes. The nodes include two Classifiers, two Forwarders and two Service Functions, one attached to each of the forwarder. All nodes are Openvswitches.
In order to pass data through a particular path, we invoke REST APIs on the Manager with payloads including details of the path. Then the manager sends instructions to all the nodes and inserts flow table entries in the nodes, making the path which we want the flow packets to take. We are leveraging the concept of Network Service Headers in this setup to achieve packet flow paths. [4] . NSH headers are a kind of metadata with which we layer on the top of incoming packets of the flow. They have a service index(SI) and NSH actions associated with them. The SI keeps track of it's visit to service functions and is decremented as the packets come out of the service functions. NSH actions decide the next node in the chain to be visited. When the SI index becomes zero, the packet reaches the forwarder, which removes the headers from the packet and actually transfers the actual packets of the flow to the intended destination. Data packets of the flow in addition to the NSH headers are finally encapsulated in another transport protocol, which is UDP(User Datagram Protocol) here for its low-latency and simplicity.
When a data packet tries to go to a destination and if there is our framework deployed there, it enters the Classifier. The Classifier has rules, based on what kind of data packets we want to let go through our framework. In our case, we have configured Classifier to accept TCP packets with a specific source network and a specific destination network. So, if the incoming packet matches all these three attributes at the Classifier, it enters our framework through the Classifier. As these data packets come out of the classifier, the classifier encapsulates these packets with NSH headers. These headers as explained above, decide which Forwarder is the next hop for the data packets. Once, the data packet reaches the intended Forwarder, it's intended Service Function is the next to receive the packets, where we implement our logic of the framework. The Service Function parses the incoming packets and extracts the payload in the packet. The packet parsing as well as payload extraction is being done through python scripts in the service function. We display this extracted payload as 'Hello! How are you?' as a demonstration of the fact that we are able to analyze the payload of an online flow. We consider this a successful proof of concept. The next steps of the project are discussed in the next section.
IV. RESULTS / FUTURE WORK
The cost, with regard to performance, of this circuit as compared to a conventional network was negligible. Evidence of its completion is scene in Figure 2 . A TCP dump of the service function reveals the path of the packet from the service function to the service function forwarder. It also reveals the identifying "hello, how are you" text placed in the packet. This use of TCP dump, in itself shows a clever way of inspecting packets without "touching" the data flow.
Figure 2 TCP Dump of Service Function
The next immediate step is to replace the simple function in the proof of concept with a more complex security-based alogorithm. An example of this is the four lines of pseudocode displayed in Figure 3 , along with a function that identifies elephant flows, replaces a trust-only paradigm to a trust-andverify paradigm.
Figure 3 Simple Security Algorithm
This simple inspection on the traversing data is looking for an executable hiding in the elephant flow. If an executable is found, the packet could be removed from the flow and sent to a second service function for additional scrutiny. For example, this service function could differentiate false positives from packets that should be dropped. This is graphically depicted in Figure 4 , where using custom algorithms the green traffic is deemed benign and quickly sent to its destination. The yellow requires a bit more scrutiny but also returns to its original journey, the red however is deemed malicious and dropped and stored for later analysis.
Figure 4 Chained Service Functions
The following step would be to scale the circuit up to the higher speeds dicsussed in the text. Also move from virtualization software to hardware. Several of white-box switches (e.g., Pica 8) supply prommising technology to handle the described system. Service function on independent commodity hardware fortified with FPGA are already being tested for inclusion int the system Finally, multiple devices/sites can be coordinated through a layer of middleware. Depending on the case, the recipient may receive data transformed in some expected way or original data, while analysis information may be gathered from the data and sent to a different recipient. With regard to security, an attack on one institution can alert other institutions on the WAN through the use of suitable middleware. This middleware development will progress as the project matures.
V. Conclusions
This paper is peppered with many direct statements and innuendos declaring the need and benefits of using AoW to monitor High Bandwidth networks. To reiterate: The case to monitor lies in the assumption that in the near future 100gbs networks will be available for all types of internet traffic therefore exposing high bandwidth networks to common criminal hackers. When this happens an effective IDS will be needed. In the meantime, unmonitored science networks without an air gap are fertile ground for APTs to try to gain access to government systems.
In addition to these compelling motivations we conclude that using an AoW system will provide the means for network and security architects to customizing algorithms that can respond to different types of threats. The system will also be if (elephant() !=0) //confirm { /*…handling the flow in sf1*/ if (isExecutable() !=0) { drop();save();} //maybe handled by another sf else { letPass();} } else {/*…handle the flow in sf2 with more scrutiny…*/ } able to gain intelligence from a threat as opposed to simply passing or dropping a packet. This may improve cyber and national security in general. Also the cost of adapting this new scalable system will likely be cheaper than adapting vendor based solutions which need to be updated with each incremental improvement of technology. Finally, federating a wide area network that can dynamically and immediately alert other network hubs of an attack opens up a lot new potential regarding defensive strategies especially in the unlikely event of a large scale attack against multiple related institutions and assets.
